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Introduction
Lucas (1976) drew attention to the fact that reduced-form models, while very useful for forecasting, were not suitable for econometric policy evaluation: when a change in economic policy is introduced, agents may react, changing their expectations and behaviour, and this will shift the parameters of that reduced-form model. For example, policymakers might estimate a Phillips curve and see a trade-off between output and inflation, but if they tried to exploit this trade-off, agents would notice, they would adjust their behaviour to their new expectations of higher future inflation, and the effect on output would be smaller than what policymakers expected; later on, policymakers would reestimate their model with new data, and would find that the trade-off was in fact less advantageous than initially thought. The solution for this is to use structural, microfounded models, with deep parameters: by estimating not the relationship between output and inflation, but the coefficients of the utility function of consumers and of firms' production function, policymakers could attain a model that is invariant to policy changes, and therefore better suited for econometric policy evaluation.
DSGE models should, in principle, meet these criteria. But, as shown by Cogley and Yagihashi (2010) and by Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2011), a model which is not correctly specified (e.g. because it uses the wrong specification for price stickiness, or because it does not take into account agent heterogeneity) will also display parameter instability issues in response to policy shocks, and may provide inaccurate policy advice. Cogley and Yagihashi (2010) use a model with state-dependent pricing to generate data, simulating a policy shift designed to resemble the change in US monetary policy around the time of the Volcker disinflation; they then use those data to estimate a model with time-dependent pricing à la Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996) ; they find that due to this model misspecification "private-sector parameters shift across regimes, some by an economically meaningful amount", but also that in terms of welfare the cost of using the wrongly-specified model to derive optimal policy is relatively minor. For their part, Chang, Kim and Schorfheide (2011) generate simulated data using a heterogeneous-agents model in which households have to insure themselves against idiosyncratic income risks (an economy where equilibrium outcomes depend on the crosssectional distribution of households' wealth and earnings, which in turn depend on the policy regime), and then use those data to estimate a representative-agent model; they find that "if the representative-agent model is estimated with data from the heterogeneous-agents economy under different policy regimes, several important parameters vary considerably", including preference and technology parameters; that "the prediction bias due to imperfect aggregation is substantially larger than the prediction intervals that reflect parameter estimation uncertainty"; and also that "the representative-agent model that abstracts from cross-sectional heterogeneity on the household side can potentially mislead fiscal policy predictions", with important welfare losses caused by deriving policy advice from a misspecified DSGE model.
In another branch of the literature, empirical studies have found parameter drift in estimated DSGE models, using very different approaches and methodologies. . In section 3 (which is the main contribution of this paper), I will consider the implications of observed parameter drift for policymaking, looking at the impulse response functions of the estimated model and analysing how they change over time. I will carry out a pseudo-real-time exercise, which will question whether policy advice derived from estimated DSGE models would have differed fundamentally from that which the policymakers of the is subject to the Lucas critique, it may make you wrongly believe that there is a sizeable tradeoff between output and inflation that can be exploited, but when you try to do so, the parameters of your model change, and then you find that the re-estimated models show a not-so-advantageous trade-off. Section 4 draws conclusions.
The aim of this paper is to show, looking at history, that these flaws of DSGE models identified by the literature can lead to mistaken policy evaluation at critical times: exactly when such policies are implemented. This does not mean that DSGE models are as bad as reduced-form models from the 70s or that they should be abandoned, but it does mean that they have to be used with caution, in full awareness of these issues. Most economists may already be mindful of this, but it is still worth pointing out, since there are also many who attribute to these models a degree of perfection that they ultimately seem to lack.
1. In most other models, agents think that all parameters are fixed and invariant, and that they will remain so for the foreseeable future. Even if the exercise shows that all parameters are found to be changing, agents in the model will never be aware of this fact, and they will not consider the possibility of future changes in their decision-making. 2. These issues would be similar to those created by omitted variables in standard regressions: if there is one parameter drifting (for example, the Calvo parameter for wages), but the estimation exercise leaves it fixed and only allows another parameter to drift (for example, wage indexation), it could wrongly conclude that this second parameter is drifting too (if the effects of increasing one or the other are, to some extent, similar).
3. This is simply a visual illustration, and section 2 does not aim to establish proof of parameter instability in the data: that has already been done with a lot more scientific rigour by Inoue and Rossi (2008 The data for the estimation will also be that used by Smets 4. For such a formal test, go to the aforementioned paper by Inoue and Rossi (2008) . Note that their test has the same internal consistency issues as my rolling-window and recursive estimations: even if the agents in the model live in a world where parameter changes are possible -and, in fact, observed-they believe that parameters are fixed and will not change in the future (but actually, according to Quoidbach, Gilbert and Wilson (2013) , that is, to some extent, how humans behave). Also, their test looks for a single structural break that affects all parameters at the same point in time; my sample is too long for just one single break point (the early 1970s, 1984, and the late 2000s, are all good candidates for a break point) and I want to consider the possibility of different parameters changing at different points in time; their test could be extended to allow for several break points, but this would further diminish its power (and their own Monte Carlo analysis already shows that unrealistically long sample sizes are required for the test to have high power). . But the other six should definitely be constant: they are deep, structural parameters, which describe the utility function of consumers, the production function of firms, and the steady state around which the whole model is built.
7.
As an informal test to see whether Calvo and indexation parameters can be seen as really deep parameters or, alternatively, as parameters linked to inflation performance and monetary policy, I have repeated this rolling-window exercise but estimating only these parameters, keeping all others at their estimated values from the 1948-2011 sample. The results are qualitatively similar to those presented in Chart 1: price stickiness has a clear upward trend, wage stickiness shows some ups and downs, and indexation parameters display sizeable swings, but are estimated with such great uncertainty that it is not possible to draw clear conclusions for them. If the reason is that the real world is evolving, models will have to take this into account, especially if that evolution is related to economic policy. If things such as how much households care about their future, or about their past level of consumption, or about their leisure, are changing over time, they could be doing so in response to different economic policies, and then any model used for econometric policy evaluation should take into account how this process works (how the economic policies it will analyse can alter the behaviour of consumers).
If, on the other hand, the behaviour of agents in the real world has not changed at a deep level (i.e. there are some truly structural parameters that remain constant), and the observed drift in coefficients is due to misspecification of the model or to estimation issues, then the source of misspecification should be identified and the model "fixed", or the estimation procedure should be improved and the identification issues solved. But that is a daunting task. There are lots of possible sources of misspecification and lack of identification, and finding a DSGE model that can go through the rolling-window estimation exercise 8 without showing parameter drift is not easy 9 .
8. Actually, the proper test would be that of Inoue and Rossi, but its power issues in "small" samples also have to be taken into account. 9. Part of the problem is that the model has to be estimated: it needs to have the ability to match the observed data, and this is surprisingly uncommon. For example, a near-flexible-prices version of the Smets and Wouters model, with Calvo and indexation parameters set at 0.01, will not lead to acceptable estimation values unless priors are narrowed (some other parameters go towards zero or infinity); but narrowing the priors to obtain a good estimation is not a desirable alternative, because it can be abused: if it is overdone, the stable-parameters result can be forced. Setting those parameters at 0.1 instead of 0.01 makes the estimation work, but is not a solution to model drift anyway: the rollingwindow estimation exercise still suggests that several supposedly deep parameters are evolving over time. The same result is obtained if only the Calvo parameters are set to 0.1, or if Calvo, indexation and habits are all set to 0.1. And the same result again for more radical departures: replacing rational expectations (which are convenient and impose discipline but may not be realistic and could be a source of misspecification) with backward-looking expectations does not remove the drift either, even if they are designed to match the behaviour of observed expectations (as proxied by the Survey of Professional Forecasters from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia). Impulse response functions: the pseudo-real-time exercise
The previous section has shown some indications that supposedly structural models may not be as stable as they should be: deep parameters should remain constant, but a rolling- The biggest problem with this parameter drift is that it could be caused by policy changes, and in that case these models would be unfit to perform econometric policy evaluation: policymakers could use a model to evaluate how the economy would react to their actions, then make their choices and implement some policies, and finally find that the modeled economy has changed and the effect of the policies is not what they anticipated.
In terms of our model, the real problem would not be that the parameters are drifting, but that the impulse response functions of the model may be changing, and that they may be doing so in response to policy changes: if the coefficients change but the IRF to the shock that represents the policy is mostly unchanged, then parameter drift would not be such a big problem. It is therefore important to evaluate not only whether parameters are stable, but also how these impulse response functions change when the coefficients of the model evolve over time, especially around changes in economic policy. This could be done with the IRFs derived from the rolling-window estimation presented in the previous section. But instead of that, in this section I will run a pseudo-real-time exercise, looking at the policy advice that a policymaker from the 1970s would have derived from the estimation of the Smets-Wouters model, and comparing that to the performance of an old-style Phillips Curve estimated using ordinary least squares (as a representation of a worst-case scenario for the technology available to this hypothetical policymaker).
It is often argued 10 that at least part of the economic woes from the 1970s was caused by economic policy mistakes. In particular, that policymakers wrongly identified a trade-off between output and inflation, and tried to exploit it, generating inflation without achieving the expected response of output, and then seeing their estimation of the trade-off becoming a lot less advantageous, once the policies had been applied. Lucas (1976) presents an explanation of why this could have happened: they were estimating Phillips curves, and did not take into account how their policies would affect the coefficients of those reduced-form models. The suggested solution to this problem is to use structural models, with deep parameters whose estimation should remain constant over time, invariant to policy changes. The Smets-Wouters model represents the state-of-the-art evolution of such models, extended and expanded to better fit the data, and similar, for example, to models in use nowadays at many central banks. In this section, then, I will try to answer the following question: if the policymakers of the 1970s had been using the Smets-Wouters model instead of their old-style Phillips curves, would they have identified similar trade-offs, and would they also have found them to be smaller-than-originally-expected after the policy was implemented? That is to say, would policy evaluation derived from the DSGE model have been constant around the time when the policy shock was implemented?
See, for example Fuhrer et al (2009).
The results from the exercise are summarised in Chart 2, which plots the impulse response functions from each estimated set of parameters, always to a 1 point shock to interest rates, and in Chart 3, which takes the responses of output and inflation from Chart 2 and plots the evolution over time of the ratio between them. This is similar to the slope of the 11. Additionally, the usual form in which the Phillips curve in DSGE models is presented (as a relationship between inflation and marginal cost) is not suitable for this exercise, since it relies on the fact that marginal cost is proportional to the output gap, which is not the case when the parameters of the model are not constant. A form that relates output and inflation can be derived, but the IRF ratio would still be more relevant, since it is closer to what policymakers look at, and it is a better summary of the dynamic trade-off. 12. This switch from rolling-window estimation in the previous section to recursive estimation here is because rolling windows are better at showing the evolution of the parameters over time, but I believe recursive estimation is closer to what central banks actually do. In any case, I have checked that the results would be very similar with a rollingwindow exercise. 13. The shock is always a 1 percentage point reduction in interest rates on impact, but may be slightly different in the following quarters, depending on the inertia implied by the re-estimation of the model; in any case, differences in this path of interest rates are relatively small, as shown in Chart 2.
Chart 2: pseudo-real-time exercise: impulse response functions interest rates after an interest rate shock effect of interest rates on (annualized) inflation effect of interest rates on output effect of interest rates on employment 14. In fact, he relates this particular episode to a "Machiavellian purpose of ensuring Nixon's 1972 reelection".
15.
As an example, a value of 2 in the graph for a 3-year horizon means that an interest rate shock that increases the level of output by 2% on average over three years, also increases inflation by one percentage point on average over that same period. 16. For reference, with the coefficients from Smets and Wouters (2007) , who use data from 1966-2004 in the estimation of the model, the response of output is 1.6 times bigger than the response of inflation over the first year, and 1.75 times bigger on average over the first three years. 17. Whether this change is significative or not may be of little interest: if policymakers see that their estimation changes in a noticeable way, they may investigate why that happened, and whether the change is significative or not, but regardless of the results they will use the new impulse response functions for policy evaluation anyway, therefore the shift does not need to be significative in order to be relevant. 18. The results of the rolling-window estimations of Section 2, and of the recursive estimation presented here, could be biased because of the difficulty in estimating with relatively short samples the parameters that characterise the steady state of the economy: long-run empirical regularities are usually detected by using a 30-year sample or larger. This is important because the dynamics of the modeled economy are defined as differences from this badly-identified steady state. So, as a robustness check, I have repeated all of these rolling-window and recursive estimations, but fixing the steady-state parameters to their estimated parameters from the longest sample . Results are relatively similar, if somewhat more muted. In the rolling-window estimation, most of the parameters still show strong indications of instability, but for example the variability of the estimated parameter for price indexation is visibly smaller when the steady-state parameters are kept constant throughout the exercise. For the recursive estimation presented here, the estimated sacrifice ratio between output and inflation still shows a very relevant fall from the 1948-1970 to the 1948-1973 estimations, but it is somewhat smaller: for horizons of 1-3 years, instead of falling from 2.1-2.6 to 1.1-1.4 (a 50% drop), with a constant steady state, the estimated sacrifice ratio falls from 1.7-1.9 to 1.0-1.4 (a 30-40% drop).
As an additional robustness check, I have also estimated the model keeping the Calvo and indexation parameters fixed at their estimated values from the 1948-2011 sample. This causes other parameters to display slightly larger shifts (mainly habits and the elasticity of labour supply to the real wage), and the results remain unaltered, at least qualitatively. Around the policy experiment, the estimated sacrifice ratio between output and inflation falls slightly less, and a bit more slowly, but the shift is still there: the ratio falls from 2.5-2.8 in the 1948-1970 estimation to 1.7-2.1 in the 1948-1974 estimation (a 25-30% drop). Then I have also repeated this exercise keeping all parameters at their estimated value from the 1948-2011 sample, except for the Calvo and indexation parameters. In this case, the shift in the estimated trade-off completely disappears. This suggests that it is not these reduced-form mechanisms that are driving the result, but other -supposedly structural-parameters. This is not fundamentally different from what these virtual policymakers would have experienced had they estimated a simple Phillips curve (with the same specification that is , and a similar experience (believing there is a trade-off that can be exploited, trying to exploit it, and then seeing this policy fail and the estimation of the trade-off shift) seems entirely plausible.
There is no definitive proof here that the shift in the estimated parameters, and in the resulting impulse response functions, is due to the economic policy implemented in those years. Those were convoluted times, and many things were happening all at the same time. This paper, apart from providing further indication of this parameter instability in the data, has looked at how the drift of coefficients in estimated DSGE models would have shifted the policy advice derived from them around the time when these policies were implemented.
Since they should be invariant to policy changes, DSGE models were supposed to be the recipe that would provide policymakers with robust advice; but, as shown in the pseudo-real- What should be done then? Trying to perfect DSGE models, bringing them closer to reality, finding misspecification issues and looking for variants that are resilient to the kind of problem presented here, all seem like good ways forward. We should also try to keep their estimation up-to-date -in order to use a version of the model that is as close to recent reality as possible-and watch out for parameter drift. But we should probably also worry a little less about the risks of adding reduced-form mechanisms or non-rational expectations to these models. A simple mention of the Lucas critique should not be enough to disregard these solutions, since we do not really have -as yet-an alternative that is truly immune to that critique.
